

## Vancouver's Downtown Eastside Community Development project: lessons for other governments

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On May 26, 2003, a huge dinner took place at the Floata Restaurant in Vancouver's historic Chinatown. The event was organized by the Vancouver Chinatown Revitalization Committee to celebrate the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Carnegie Centre and to raise funds for the Downtown Eastside Arts and Culture Trust Fund. Close to 800 people bore witness to the fact that meaningful change in Canada's most distressed neighbourhoods *is* possible.

To many of the people who live and work in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, this is a community of diverse neighbourhoods with rich histories, where difference is accepted, where belonging is possible, where residents and merchants want to do what they can to make it a better place to be. To many of the people who live and work outside of it, this community is known for containing the poorest postal code in Canada, for having an open drug market at Main and Hastings, and as the shameful part of a prosperous city where drug addicts, sex workers and poor people are thrown away.

Vancouver's Downtown Eastside is all of those things, and more. A mere three years before that fundraising dinner, it was also a community where opposing coalitions were clashing openly with each other and with the City, over Vancouver's proposed drug policy and health services in the area. There wasn't much meaningful dialogue between them, and there wasn't a lot of agreement on what needed to be done to tackle crime and improve community safety.

What happened to shift this seemingly stalemate situation to one where an incredibly diverse group of people could come together in the Floata Restaurant, across cultural, linguistic and philosophical differences as neighbours, friends, families, merchants, politicians and government staff, to share in the celebration of the future of this community? As with any complex situation, there is no simple answer. But what's clear is that the innovative crime prevention project known as the ***Downtown Eastside Community Development Project*** (DTESCDP) played a significant part.

*It is all about the relationships...you need all the other tools...but without people being able to speak to each other, it doesn't work.*

Key Respondent  
(Coyne, 2006)

### Learning from this project

In this article, we take a brief<sup>1</sup> look at some of the key learnings that emerged from this project. Originally conceived of as a "crime prevention through social development" demonstration project, the DTESCDP (1999-2004) was conducted in a context of historic distrust between community and government, and of more open conflict in recent years

between and amongst community groups, social service agencies and all three levels of government. The project also took place in a complex and changing policy environment, and engaged a diversity of people and groups in several neighbourhoods challenged by the most extreme manifestations of social and economic exclusion in which different approaches to crime and community safety were clearly competing. As such, the DTESCDP offers significant learnings which we hope might benefit other cities and their partners who are involved in collaborative efforts to address crime and community safety issues, particularly in marginalized communities.

## Why this project now?

More and more governments have recognized that continuing to address issues only once they have reached crisis proportions – whether this is in the area of health care, or crime, or the environment - is not just incredibly costly, it is simply not sustainable. There is also growing recognition that complex issues require complex solutions and that no one level of government, or sector, or community group has all the skills, information and resources needed to successfully address the complex community issues that challenge us today.

This was certainly very clear to the City of Vancouver by the mid-90s. As with other cities across Canada, Vancouver had experienced a significant increase in homelessness, in poverty and in addictions in the early 1990s, along with the accompanying increase in crime, victimization and fear in its most vulnerable neighbourhoods. The City was determined to play a leadership role in trying to address this complicated and complex situation through working comprehensively and strategically with all of the partners that would need to be involved in a concerted effort to create a vibrant, safe, and healthy Downtown Eastside community.

Comprehensive, integrated approaches to crime prevention and community safety have the greatest potential to prevent crime, victimization and fear in a sustainable way, and to contribute to safe, healthy and vibrant communities. The City of Vancouver thus applied to the Government of Canada's National Crime Prevention Strategy for funding for a five year "crime prevention through social development" demonstration project. Other funding partners included the City of Vancouver, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Status of Women Canada, Canadian Heritage and the BC Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General (with resources from each partner dedicated to specific types of activities).

## What was the project?

The purpose of the project was to mobilize the Downtown Eastside community and build capacity among residents, agencies, and business representatives to address some of the known risk factors for involvement in crime and victimization – such as poverty, homelessness, addictions and family issues – and to do this in a cohesive and collaborative way. The goals were:

- to strengthen the participation of residents, agencies, and businesses in community decision-making;
- to build community leadership;
- to promote community cohesion;
- to improve socio-economic conditions ;
- to influence the implementation of public policy that addresses risk factors associated with crime and victimization; and
- to promote, within the broader Vancouver community, recognition of the strengths and capacities of the Downtown Eastside low-income community.

The activities of the project were primarily conducted through five major components:

- *Community Directions*: focused on mobilizing and building capacity amongst the low-income community, particularly those who are often excluded from decision-making processes;
- *Vancouver's Chinatown Revitalization Committee*: formed to strengthen the capacity of Chinatown businesses, family associations and community agencies to play an active role in revitalization of their community;
- *Coordination and Community Cohesion*: sought to connect disparate parts of the community by linking various initiatives in the community, facilitating communication with the City and other partners, connecting the project components to each other, and supporting projects aimed at strengthening capacity;
- *Youth Employment*: provided training opportunities for youth at risk; and
- *Communication*: played an important role in educating the broader community throughout Vancouver about the root causes of crime.

The project was connected to other City initiatives under the umbrella of the Downtown Eastside Revitalization Program. This also served as a conduit for the project to connect with the Vancouver Agreement<sup>2</sup> - a five year, award-winning, urban development agreement between the City, the provincial government and the federal government. The initial aim of the agreement was to have all three levels work together to support sustainable economic, social and community development on the Downtown Eastside. The Vancouver Agreement was recently renewed for a second term.

### Why this approach?

A balanced approach to addressing crime recognizes that enforcement - while necessary – is costly and inefficient if used alone. The “crime prevention through social development” approach is based on the well-accepted premise that particular **risk factors** at individual, family and societal levels may increase both the likelihood of individual involvement in crime and victimization, and of the presence of crime, victimization and fear in a community. These risk factors include: lack of positive role models, low literacy, family distress, drug and alcohol abuse, as well as poverty, homelessness, and lack of services (social, cultural, recreational).

Conversely, the presence of particular **protective factors** can increase the resiliency of both individuals and communities. These protective factors include: positive adult role models, success at school, healthy prenatal and early childhood development, strong networks of friends and family, as well as steady employment, stable housing, and availability of services.

The DTESCDP used a crime prevention through social development approach to complement the enforcement and other types of initiatives that were operating in the Downtown Eastside at that time.

## What were some of the successes?

In general terms, the independent and extensive evaluation conducted at the end of the project<sup>3</sup>, concluded that, as a result of the project:

- there was greater capacity to work together to address the root causes of crime than there was before the project began;
- community participation processes were, for the most part, working effectively;
- individuals who had not played leadership roles before were now active in a leadership capacity;
- communication between the community and government had improved;
- programs identified as needed by the community and responding to specific needs were now operating; and
- diverse groups in the community were more likely to communicate and work together than they were before the project began.

In specific terms, some of the outcomes included:

- **Increased employment opportunities**
  - a community development corporation – EMBERS – was developed and supports residents to develop businesses;
  - unemployed youth have been trained and supported to find employment and go on to further education;
- **Improved quality of life**
  - 65% of key respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the quality of life in the community had improved since the project began;
  - access to sport for low-income children had increased and parents were now more involved supporting their children in team sports;
  - the First Nations working group successfully established the Aboriginal Front Door, a First Nations traditional culture and healing centre;
- **Increased citizen participation**
  - a broad range of community members had actively participated in developing community plans with respect to key issues such as housing, alcohol and drugs, services for children and families, and community economic development;
  - 85.2% of key respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that First Nations participation had been strengthened by this project;

- **Collaboration and cohesion**
  - 84% of participants agreed or strongly agreed that understanding among community groups had been strengthened;
  - groups that had not previously worked together were now collaborating on community initiatives;
  - the Chinatown community was now working together effectively to revitalize their community, and with other neighbouring communities to address common issues;
  - government representatives indicated that they were working differently with community as a result of this project; and
  - there was collaboration on the part of all three levels of government to implement health initiatives, undertake public realm projects in Chinatown and Victory Square, support the development of the Aboriginal Front Door, coordinate economic development planning and invest in low threshold employment and business development.

### Did the project reduce the crime rate?

A reduction in particular types of crimes was indeed reported during the project's tenure (e.g. Homicide and Attempted Murder was down 50% from 1999-2002<sup>4</sup>). However, given the numerous other initiatives taking place at the same time, it is difficult to attribute these changes to *this project alone*. Further, we know that crime rates are not the best or only indicators of true levels of crime and victimization given that most crime is never reported to the police<sup>5</sup>.

There is significant evidence that the project clearly addressed known *risk and protective factors* at a multitude of levels, particularly through: building individual and community capacity; fostering partnerships between community groups and governments; promoting community cohesion; and bringing different neighbourhoods together to create a common vision to bring back the health and prosperity of the Downtown Eastside.

Further, a follow-up evaluation conducted some two years after the project ended found that many of the outcomes had been sustained and are clearly "continuing to contribute to ripples of change in the community"<sup>6</sup>. Not only are key project initiatives such as Vancouver's Chinatown Revitalization Committee, the Aboriginal Front Door, MoreSports, and EMBERS continuing to operate and evolve<sup>7</sup>, but the use of inclusive processes and community based approaches has been institutionalized as evidenced in many major initiatives including the 2010 Olympics and Paralympics.

### What made it work and what can we learn from it?

The DTESCDP provides some key learnings for governments involved in collaborative, multi-partner efforts to create safe, healthy and vibrant communities, particularly in distressed neighbourhoods.

## 1. Adequate Time and Resources

The DTESCDP was a complex and complicated project and the early community mobilization phase was one marked by confusion and conflict. Taking the time necessary to understand and address this confusion and conflict, and to work collaboratively with the community to develop processes that were trusted and effective, was critical to the ultimate success of the project.

If community leadership is to be real, and if the community is to be persuaded to trust and work together with government, outcomes cannot be narrowly specified at the outset of the project and governments must be willing and able to commit resources for community driven projects which are unpredictable.

*It is a  
marathon,  
not a  
quick fix.*

Key Respondent  
(Coynes, 2006)

Low-income residents and other marginalized groups in the Downtown Eastside had historically lacked ways to have their voices heard, and so the focus of the project could not initially be on partnership-building and collaboration, it had to be on basic capacity-building - which is incredibly time consuming. The length of the project (initially five years), and the willingness of many of the funders to accept a certain degree of risk, created the conditions necessary for change.

The key factors of flexibility in community mobilization processes, and extensive trust building with multiple partners (discussed below), could not have been possible within a short time frame. A community-cohesion and capacity-building approach to crime prevention and revitalization requires time, resources, patience, and resilience from all stakeholders. Crime prevention projects that focus on community development and capacity building need long-term commitment and long-term funding. These are not short-term projects.

## 2. Using a population-centred approach to “community mobilization” processes

One of the main purposes of the project was to mobilize the Downtown Eastside community and build capacity among residents, agencies, and business representatives to address some of the known risk factors for involvement in crime and victimization. This focus on mobilization recognized that “it is the people who live, work and play in the community who best understand their area’s assets, problems, needs and capacities” (National Crime Prevention Centre, 2000).

But what does “community mobilization” look like when it takes place in a community with many conflicts, with a history of mistrust and misunderstanding between the community and governments, where low-income residents and other marginalized groups have historically lacked ways to have their voices heard?

The answer is “it depends”. Ultimately in the DTESCDP it ended up looking different, for different groups, at different times. Two main community mobilization processes

emerged - Community Directions (CD) and the Vancouver Chinatown Revitalization Committee (VCRC).

Community Directions was born following protracted negotiations between the City and representatives of the low-income community. Its purpose was to mobilize and build leadership among the low-income community by bringing together residents and community organizations in a comprehensive planning process aimed at developing community-based solutions to various neighbourhood issues. Its goal was to ensure that all voices in this very diverse community were heard and that residents would take leadership roles in both the development of the plans and in their implementation.

It was agreed that this process would be resourced, but not determined, by the City - instead of project staff designing and implementing the process, this responsibility would be undertaken by a Steering Committee elected by and accountable to a monthly General Meeting open to all residents and community workers. Once the community had decided how best to proceed and what projects would be undertaken, the City would provide resources for their implementation.

Not surprisingly this open structure created many challenges but the community's insistence on this "arm's length" structure indicates a point of fundamental importance to the evolution of the project – a lack of community trust in government's intentions. The community felt that only if they had control of the process and its resources could they be assured that the outcome of the project would truly benefit the low-income residents.

The Chinatown Revitalization process differed from the Community Directions process in that it was not primarily a resident mobilization program. In part, this was because there are only 800 residents in Chinatown, and most of them live in family clans' residences that were built in the early days. However, more importantly, Chinatown occupies a unique place in Chinese-Canadian history. As the main arrival point for many Chinese-Canadians and the focus of much Chinese-Canadian culture, Chinatown is an important part of the lives of many people who do not, or no longer, live there. For these reasons, the Revitalization process focused on working with the many cultural, business and family clan organizations based in or otherwise concerned with Chinatown.

*The DTESCDP  
moved people from  
flight or fight to  
there being no  
reason to fight – we  
are now singing from  
the same song sheet  
with respect and  
appreciation for  
each other.*

Key Respondent  
(Coynes, 2006)

However, as with the Community Directions process, the project began in a context of hostility and mistrust, partly for historical reasons and partly for reasons of current policies. Historically, the Chinese-Canadian community has been much discriminated against by government – restrictions were placed on where Chinese-Canadians could live or own property. The memory of this discrimination remains strong and leads to suspicion of government motives. More recently, the

problems associated with crime and drug use in the area have impacted Chinatown and the City's response to these issues - in the form of clinics and other health-based policies and facilities - was not well-understood or supported by the community, which tended to have a more law-and-order focused point of view. Furthermore, many suspected that the location of these facilities indicated indifference on the part of government to the problems facing Chinatown.

Given this context, project activities sought above all to build leadership and cohesion between the diverse participants and between the community and government. A Vancouver Chinatown Revitalization Committee (VCRC) was formed to co-ordinate communication and provide leadership while a number of sub-committees worked to address issues of importance to the community, such as Arts and Culture, Marketing and Promotions, Youth Involvement and Parking. Another committee worked on developing a longer term plan for the area and became known as the Chinatown Vision sub-committee.

This flexibility – the openness on the part of project staff and their partners to use different approaches to mobilization depending on the needs and stated desires of the population being engaged – was critical to the capacity-building successes of the project.

### **3. Leadership development**

A key learning from the project's early experiences with community mobilization is the importance of using a staged approach. That is, with hindsight, it is clear that having a leadership core in place before mobilizing the community as a whole would have helped to achieve community cohesion more easily. Community leadership that is confident in its strength and ability to realize its goals is better able to form partnerships and reach out to others.

Understanding the lack of capacity of marginalized residents and groups and what that means for community mobilization processes will be critical to the success of similar projects. Without a strong core of trained leaders committed to working together for the long-term, mass mobilization can be short-lived and fractious.

Capacity building projects should seek to build on and strengthen existing reasons for working together before attempting to widen contacts and partnerships. Leadership development is most effective in situations where the participants have a pre-existing pre-disposition to work together. In Chinatown, a shared cultural heritage and a strong commitment to Chinatown as a centre for Chinese-Canadian history, culture and identity provided a basis for community cohesion even if not all participants agreed on all

*There is a shifting  
to a more balanced  
leadership in the  
community with  
cultural  
organizations,  
particularly family  
societies, playing  
stronger roles than  
they have played in  
the past.*

Key Respondent  
(Coyne, 2006)

particular points. In Community Directions, working groups who shared a cultural connection, or a pressing material connection, proved better equipped to make the transition to independence and sustainability. Once that was achieved, it was then easier for them to reach out to others who did not necessarily share their background or ideas.

Further, in order to sustain the participation of community organizations, their engagement should be more definite than a simple voluntary commitment. In return for such a formal commitment, community organizations' participation should be resourced. All non-profits and community groups work with very limited resources and tight budgets and find it very difficult to spare staff time from funded work. Consequently, purely voluntary commitments tend to be pushed to the bottom of their priority list and are the first thing to be cut when their resources are particularly stressed.

#### **4. Skilled practitioners and the role of government**

The role of government in CPSD projects must go well beyond simply providing funding. City staff working on the project operated in a supportive and bridging capacity by providing information and explanation about the project in different ways to different parties – different facets of the community, different facets of the City, different funders, and other levels of government. Project staff must possess a particular skill set, be comfortable with ambiguity, understand (and have genuine respect for) the realities of different sectors (residents, social services, different levels of government, etc.) and be able to translate those across sectors in the critical process of building relationships.

In both main community engagement processes, for example, project staff engaged in a complicated and lengthy process to address the climate of distrust and anger that existed and to negotiate agreements on what the project would look like, what the City - community relationships would look like, and what support would be provided. The flexibility in adapting community mobilization processes and making them work would not have been possible without the involvement of some very skilled practitioners, and without the support of senior staff.

*City staff  
played a huge  
role in bringing  
people  
together...staff  
were very clear  
in listening to  
the community.*

Key Respondent  
(Coyne, 2006)

In a community with many conflicts and a history of mistrust and misunderstanding between the community and governments, it is essential to build trust and positive working relationships from the beginning. One very effective way to build that trust is to become much more familiar with the contexts in which different people work. For example, due to the fact that Chinatown project staff were in constant communication with both the community and the City, they developed a keen understanding of the community's needs and aspirations and were able to integrate them more efficiently into the City and Vancouver Agreement processes. Conversely, because the community interacted constantly with government, they learned what government can and cannot do as well as the best strategies for gaining

government support for their ideas. The result was a virtuous circle: as government and the community became more adept at working together, the results achieved built trust, which in turn provided further incentive to work together, achieve more results, thus building more trust and so on.

The benefits of good working relationships are clearly seen in the development and adoption of the Vision Plan. Because staff were intimately involved in the development of the plan, they were able to advise the community on the best way to present a plan the City could endorse and because staff were in constant touch with their colleagues in other departments, they were able to prepare the ground during the development of the plan to ensure broad support within the city. The result was that the plan that was submitted to Council was both realistic and achievable within the City's mandate and had support from the bureaucracy. Without these close working relationships, it is unlikely that a feasible plan could have been developed.

### **5. Creative education and communication strategies**

Opportunities for misunderstandings and miscommunications are particularly rife in the arena of crime prevention and community safety. Crime prevention is a charged environment and a significant amount of resources should be allocated to developing multiple educational and communication strategies which clearly join the dots in the complicated picture that is the social development approach to crime prevention.

Complex issues require complex solutions, and thus comprehensive community safety initiatives can be incredibly ambitious and confusing for many of the parties involved. It took a significant amount of time for the *funding partners, the City and the evaluator* to come to an agreement on the links between crime prevention, capacity-building and comprehensive community initiatives, never mind the disparate groups of residents, organizations and businesses involved in the project.

*There are more opportunities for people to be well-informed. I have seen how that leads to involvement on the ground.*

Key Respondent  
(Coyne, 2006)

Where the work is messy, emergent and unpredictable, there is a need to find a way to create a shared understanding of the issues, of the project and of how to make change, amongst the key parties involved, *sooner, rather than later*. A more collaborative project development process in the DTESCDP would perhaps have ensured that partners were clearer from the beginning about their roles, about their responsibilities, and about what collaboration might demand from them.

In the community, there was initial resistance to the whole notion of a “crime prevention project” – for many this notion more readily creates images of enforcement and punishment rather than images of social and economic inclusion. Creative, varied and multiple communication strategies were needed to get accurate information out about what the City was doing and why.

In the Chinatown Revitalization process, for example, there was conflict between and amongst community groups and the City over harm reduction versus enforcement approaches to drug abuse prevention. The Vancouver Chinatown Revitalization Committee played a critical role in communication and education – there were 28 community groups represented on this committee so community cohesion was fostered by continual discussion, debate and communication – at meetings, through the publication of a quarterly newsletter which aimed to inform both Chinatown and the wider community of the Revitalization process and its achievements, and through regular appearances by project staff and members of the committee in local media outlets such as Chinese radio and newspapers.

In Community Directions, many residents were mobilized around issues of fundamental importance to crime and safety, such as homelessness, addiction and poverty. This mobilization, especially during the development of the community plans, served to generate not only valuable input from the community to government but also to educate many members of the community on the various ideas and opinions for addressing these issues. This was a valuable contribution to community education.

Resources should be allocated to training at *all* levels. That is, “there is a need for government staff to be trained in community development and capacity building techniques so that they can adopt a community pace, adapt bureaucratic requirements to the community and communicate the needs of government more effectively. Community members also require training and support on specific aspects of working with government including proposal writing, communication, negotiation and mediation, outcome planning and measurement, and government accountability requirements” (Coyne, 2004: 89).

## **6. Being connected**

Funding from the National Crime Prevention Centre allowed this project to happen. However, embedding the project within a web of other initiatives allowed for bigger outcomes. All of the City’s programs were organized under the umbrella of the Downtown Eastside Revitalization Program in 1999 and this also served as a conduit for the project to connect with the Vancouver Agreement. There was a certain amount of support from other levels of government and from within City departments for the strategies and action plans developed by community groups, and for ways to integrate them with other initiatives.

In the early days of the Chinatown Revitalization process, for example, small initiatives were funded by the project, thus helping to build both trust between community and government, and community capacity to work together and to implement initiatives in collaboration with government. As the projects built these skills, it became possible for the community to seek and receive support from other levels of government, notably the Vancouver Agreement.

The determinants of a safe, healthy and vibrant community are well beyond the capacity of the community alone, or the City and the community acting together. The policies of

other levels of government contribute to safety, health and well-being in communities in a fundamental way, and those policies, at times, can run counter to the efforts of the community (and did do so, at times, in the DTESCDP). In any comprehensive community initiative, there is a need for an innovative and imaginative approach to governance, for all parties to work from the beginning, to develop a collaborative policy framework that would effectively reduce risk factors and increase protective factors that are known to be critical to the prevention of crime and victimization.

### **Conclusion**

In a study commissioned by the Federal/Territorial/Provincial Working Group on Community Safety and Crime Prevention, Caputo *et al* (2003)<sup>8</sup> identified eight elements that were present in communities that had sustained crime prevention:

- a commitment to issues of local concern;
- an iterative process;
- investment in capacity;
- leaders;
- working together;
- resources;
- vertical and horizontal linkages;
- and realized outcomes - nothing succeeds like success.

These elements were most evident in those parts of the project that are “continuing to contribute to ripples of change in the community”<sup>9</sup>, two years after the project end. Further, Coyne and Associates (2006) point to some clear lessons learned from the project re: what is necessary for sustained community capacity and community capacity building processes:

- meaningful to the community
- process and consensus;
- relationships and partnerships;
- organizational structure;
- financial resources;
- leadership; and
- results focused.

Ultimately, meaningful crime prevention will be sustainable in a community when efforts evolve from one particular project to a broader community vision and process. Two years after the end of the DTESCDP, it is clear that the City of Vancouver, its partners, and the communities that make up the Downtown Eastside are *both seeing and doing things differently*.

The DTESCDP was one vehicle used to build individual and community capacity, to foster partnerships, to promote community cohesion, and to bring different neighbourhoods together to create a common vision to bring back the health and prosperity of the Downtown Eastside. The allocation of adequate time and resources, flexibility in the project’s community mobilization processes, the deep involvement of local government and skilled practitioners, the use of creative education and

communication strategies, and the connection of the project to other initiatives, were keys to its successes.

Ultimately, the long-term potential of a crime prevention project like the DTESCDP is perhaps best captured in the words of one of the residents: *I dream that the people will have opportunities to work, be recognized for their gifts and talents, and be able to live in a secure place of a healthy community.* The DTESCDP demonstrates that a long-term, solid investment with committed partners and meaningful community involvement can help begin to make that dream a reality.

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<sup>1</sup> This article provides a simplified snapshot of an incredibly complex project. For detailed project and evaluation reports, as well as articles focussing on different aspects of the project, see the following documents, online at <http://vancouver.ca/commsvcs/planning/dtes/project.htm> :  
City of Vancouver (2006a) *Vancouver's Downtown Eastside Community Development Project: lessons for crime prevention and community safety.*  
City of Vancouver (2004). *Report to Council on the Downtown Eastside Community Development Project.*  
City of Vancouver (2002). *Building Community: Profiles from Community Directions & the Downtown Eastside Community Development Project*  
Coyne, Kathy (2004a) *Fostering Change From Within: A community capacity building approach to crime prevention in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.* Downtown Eastside Crime Prevention/Community Development Project Evaluation. Final Report 1999 – 2004  
Coyne, Kathy (2004b) *Fostering Change From Within: Summary of the Final Report 1999-2004*  
Riño-Alcalá, Pilar et al. (2004) *Communities, Community Workers and Local Government: Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned in a Community Development Project in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver.* School of Social Work and Family Studies, University of British Columbia.

<sup>2</sup> See details at <http://www.vancouveragreement.ca>

<sup>3</sup> Coyne, Kathy (2004b) *Fostering Change From Within: Summary of the Final Report 1999-2004*

<sup>4</sup> See the annual DTES Monitoring Report at <http://vancouver.ca/commsvcs/planning/dtes/index.htm>

<sup>5</sup> Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre notes that 90% of sexual assaults and 68% of non-sexual assaults are never reported to the police. NCPC, 2000. *Picture of Crime in Canada. A Fact Sheet.* Available online at [www.psepc.gc.ca](http://www.psepc.gc.ca)

<sup>6</sup> See Coyne and Associates Ltd. (2006) *Ripples of Change: Community Capacity in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside*

<sup>7</sup> For an engaging discussion of the project by key participants at all levels – its successes, challenges, strengths, and the lessons learned – watch the video *Building Community* (City of Vancouver, 2006c) Available online at <http://vancouver.ca/commsvcs/planning/dtes/project.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Tullio Caputo, Katharine Kelly, Wanda Jamieson and Liz Hart (2004) *A Portrait of Sustainable Crime Prevention in Selected Canadian Communities.* Volume 1: Main Report and Volume 2: Community Case Studies. Ottawa: Centre for Applied Population Studies, Carleton University.

<sup>9</sup> See Coyne and Associates Ltd. (2006) *Ripples of Change: Community Capacity in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside*